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Editor’s Note

Welcome to the final issue of the Ezoneplus Newsletter. The partners have, over a period of three years, attempted to shed some light on the issue areas that come with the accession of European Monetary Union (EMU) and the subsequent introduction of the Euro in the new EU member countries. As a subscriber of the newsletter, you have become aware that in the context of this project almost 40 Working Papers and several books and brochures have been published. This is a lot of food for further thought. We thank all of the participants in the project very much for their contributions. We are convinced that the efforts have helped to explain the thorny path towards “The Eastward Enlargement of the Eurozone” and, finally, to ease the decision-making processes towards this end.

We will keep the ezoneplus website www.ezoneplus.org at least until the end of this year and hope that to all of you the outcomes of this project will continue to be helpful and to provoke further discussion among scholars and politicians.

This issue provides the schedule of the final Ezoneplus conference “Exploring Uncharted Waters” that was held in Berlin on 18 June, 2004, and adds some key conclusions put forward at the conference.

The discussions during the conference were based on the project’s Final Report, the table of contents of which is added to this newsletter.

Also, during the conference the Polish colleagues presented a report on “Fiscal, Monetary and Exchange Rate Issues of the Eurozone enlargement”, of which the table of contents is added, too.

Finally, you are provided again with a survey of our newest Ezoneplus Working Paper and some information on a book derived from Ezoneplus’s December 2003 conference in Warsaw.
### Conference Programme

<table>
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<th>Time</th>
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| 09.00-09.15 | Introduction by Prof. Michael Bolle  
Freie Universität Berlin |
| 09.15-09.30 | Welcome Note by Dr. Peter Fisch  
European Commission |
| 09.30-09.45 | Key Findings by Prof. Hanns-D. Jacobsen  
Ezoneplus Project |
| 09.45-10.30 | Speech by Dr. Peter Backé  
European Central Bank |
| 10.45-11.30 | Presentation of major findings and discussion I:  
Exchange Rate Adjustment  
(Prof. Orsi, Bologna, Italy; Prof. Lavrač, Ljubljana, Slovenia) |
| 11.45-12.30 | Presentation of major findings and discussion II:  
Trade and FDI  
(Prof. Caetano, Évora, Portugal) |
| 12.30-13.30 | Lunch Buffet  
After Lunch Speech  
Large and small countries in an economic and monetary union,  
Coordinating macroeconomic policies in the Eurozone  
(Prof. Le Cacheux, Pau, France) |
| 14.45-15.30 | Presentation of major findings and discussion III:  
Labour Markets and the Social Dimension  
(Prof. Paas, Tartu, Estonia; Prof. Kiander, Helsinki, Finland) |
| 15.30-16.15 | Presentation of major findings and discussion IV:  
Fiscal Policy  
(Prof. Żukrowska, Warsaw, Poland) |
| 16.30-17.00 | Final Discussion |
2. Key findings of Ezoneplus

presented to the Final Conference of the Ezoneplus Project on 18 June 2004 by Prof. Dr. Hanns-D. Jacobsen, Managing Director

The admittance of eight CEECs into the EU, and the subsequent enlargement of the EMU, will cause deep changes within the political, economic, and social settings of both old and new EU-members. The hallmark of the current enlargement process is that it has been a political decision to include new members into the EU. The enlargement process has originated from the realization that post-communist countries required political stabilization. The marked difference between the sizes of the population and of the economies is the prime source of underlying tensions of the enlargement process. The research project Ezoneplus focuses on the ensued reshaping of politics and markets. In particular, Ezoneplus ascertains how to overcome imponderables in organizing the process of leading new EU-members toward the eurozone. In this regard, Ezoneplus tries to get the bottom of ensuring sustainable growth and convergence in respect of new members’ run-up to EMU. The simultaneous deepening of the EU *aquis communautaire* and, in particular, the adoption of a common currency entail new challenges for both old and new EU-member states.

Key results of this project may be summarized as follows: First, a common currency induces the reshaping of markets – i.e. markets adopt to new circumstances, thereby pushing the Euro-area closer to an ‘optimum currency area’. Nevertheless, reshaping will remain incomplete due to political reasons. National policy-makers cannot sacrifice their own electoral survival by implementing efficient economic and social policies. Second, as a consequence, there is an ongoing tug-of-war on the distribution of costs of social and economic adjustment between old and new member states. The political bargaining on these costs affects the prospects of stabilizing the capital influx towards CEECs and their ability to catch up to living standards in the old EU-member countries.

The stability of the CEECs’ convergence process is the main goal of both current and new EU-members. Ezoneplus discusses the implications of a particular catch-up strategy and has a look at the economic, political, social and institutional consequences involved. A process of new EU-members joining the eurozone, implying the reshaping of economic determinants that may lead to efficiency gains, has thus to consider economic adjustment and social costs as well because real convergence, based on sustainable increased growth, can only be a long-term process. In addition, both new and old EU-members have to cope with particular challenges that derive from an ageing population, growing immigration, labour shortages in key sectors and social inclusion problems. Failure to attain sustainable convergence may jeopardize the benefits arising from EU accession and may even be a source of destabilisation for old EU-members. On the one hand, Ezoneplus explores these uncharted waters along the lines of capital markets, labour markets, as well as goods and services markets with regard to trade and FDI. On the other hand, the project puts emphasis on policies related to fiscal and exchange-rate issues as well as to the social dimension of new EU-members’ convergence towards the eurozone.

This conference marked the end of a 36-months research project that has been supported by the European Commission (5th FP).
The starting point of our considerations is that economies in new EU-member countries have to rely on sizable capital influx in order to stimulate growth and real convergence towards current members of EMU. The track of EU-enlargement has to be politically stabilized and the social acceptance of the course taken be maintained. Hence, the general trend towards real exchange-rate appreciation in new EU-member countries fostering their catching-up is desirable and has to be maintained for a prolonged period.

**Capital markets**

As regards capital market integration risks are predominantly to be found in the lacking institutional quality of financial markets in new EU-member countries. National and foreign investments will only lead to more growth if the institutional environment guarantees high and safe returns. The trend real appreciation, ensuing sizable current account deficits, is partly due to a convergence play. The current high valuation is certainly a fair bet reflecting highly profitable investment opportunities. However, any doubts regarding the sustainability of convergence trigger a revaluation of assets that may lead to a reversal of capital flows. Institutional strengthening allows for linking capital markets in CEECs to mature financial markets in the eurozone. Eventually, efficient financial markets are the best preventive measure against overinvestment delivering a fair price signal of risk and chances involved in steady stream of capital influx to new EU-member countries.

**Foreign exchange markets**

In addition, capital movements are determined in the foreign exchange market. The exchange rate mirrors macroeconomic fundamentals, microeconomic risks – i.e. particularly capital market imperfections –, and in particular expectations about future economic policies. Exchange rate risk in sustainable growth regimes will eventually vanish at the onset of EMU-membership. But there is still a long way to go for new EU-members. According to Maastricht criteria and in order to achieve the entry conditions of EMU, CEECs have to rely on ‘soft pegs’ exchange-rate regimes in ERM-II. Correspondingly, to most observers, the period between entering ERM-II and entering EMU is hence the time when risks will be concentrated. Exchange-rate regimes with wide bands and only moderately overvalued conversion rates – probably achieved by a final devaluation at the outset of admittance to ERM-II – will best serve sustainable growth regimes in CEECs. Though, pursuing false economic policies will particularly lead to the well-known problems of speculative attacks and currency crises in ERM-II. In this respect, unsustainably high current account deficits may tilt the balance heavily against a successful enlargement of EMU. Guaranteeing, in turn, sustainable capital movements implies heavy burdens for national policy makers, in terms of prudent, most notably restrictive, economic policies. However, whether vote-maximising governments in new EU-member countries achieve to comply with the Maastricht criteria remains doubtful from a perspective of political economy.

**Labour markets**

Smoothly functioning labour markets could be of great help in that respect. Flexibly adjusting wages and quantities – as for the latter this would imply high flows of migration between countries – could assure that, firstly, the fulfilment of Maastricht criteria gets easier and, secondly, that convergence of per-capita-income gains speed. But it is well-known that European levels of mobility and flexibility remain conspicuously below the economic efficient values. An additional problem are high social and labour standards of the old EU-members which are likely to increase labour market rigidities and tighten the problem of unemployment in the CEECs.
Goods and services markets

Goods and services markets, finally, also show some discomforting patterns so far. On the one hand, though rather small, the incidence of trade diversion between old and new member states is not a quantité negliable. This is all the more the case, since losses are unequally distributed across old member states. Next, the patterns of specialisation between Western and Eastern Europe do not show the kind of productivity-enhancing and growth-stimulating feature a sustainable growth strategy would imply. Thus, at least for some years, or even decades, down the road a division of labour could emerge that is characterised by an exchange of eastern agricultural and western industrialised goods, a structure difficult to change. Since many of the CEECs will be able to exploit their comparative advantages only by increased exports of agricultural and low-wage, low-tech products, staunch resistance by the respective lobbies in the “old” member states is to be expected. A more balanced division of labour, even developing intra-industry trade further, depends largely on the creation of an environment that favours foreign direct investment, the transfer of technology and the development of production structures which can master all-European or global competition. In addition, adjusting goods and services markets require the political readiness of old EU-members to accept an increasing influx of products and services from CEEC.

Socially acceptable and feasible policies

The prime ‘social’ risk of such a growth regime lies in the societal acceptance of economic changes. First of all, any integration process produces winners and losers. It is among those losers where we expect to find the greatest imponderables within the process of sustainable convergence. The successful implementation of reforms hinges upon the ability of national governments to compensate losers. The enlargement process affects different segments of the population differently, dividing the electorate into ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of integration. Hence, the issues redistribution and compensation loom large into the task of implementing a sustainable growth regime.

Fiscal and exchange-rate policies

Appropriate fiscal and exchange-rate policies strengthening private sector’s expectations thus ensuring a steady stream of capital influx are required, but hard to put through. From the viewpoint of political economy, governments strive for office retention. Therefore, incumbent governments may be forced to dampen the detrimental social effects of their run-up to the eurozone. In this respect, the prescribed soft pegs in ERM-II provide perverse incentives as additional fiscal spending gives front-loaded benefits and delayed costs. Governments in CEECs will constantly have to weigh the costs of maintaining necessary policies for Maastricht compliance against the hardship of voter alienation. This holds all the more so, as current members are interested in sustainable convergence of CEECs. The latter will not hesitate to give way to the according moral hazard.

Policies should be organized in a way that the risk of disordered devaluations provoking currency crises and a reversal of capital flows is at least reduced. Prudent fiscal and exchange-rate policies may have to be supported by the old EU-members.

With both sides being reluctant to ‘pay the bill’ it comes with little surprise that there has been and will be a prolonged tug-of-war between current and new EU member countries. Hence, we expect ‘pork-barrelling’ in crucial policy areas, ranging from the EU budget, to the modalities of EMU enlargement, and to the coordination between tax and transfer systems. This kind of genuine ‘EU risk’ could further endanger the sustainable flows of capital within an enlarged Europe.
Knowing all these forms of risks and potential conflicts, *Ezoneplus* establishes what to do about them. The answer is both amazingly simple and inherently complex: The kind of sustainable growth regime intended has to assure a switch from the short term needs of guaranteeing stable capital flows to the long term need of raising national saving ratios in Eastern Europe. The point is that the EU will only come to terms with the political and economy tensions outlined so far, if the level of wealth transfer is eventually reduced to sustainable levels. The prime mechanism to do this is by enhancing national savings. Accordingly, policy advice relates to strengthening the capacities of both policies and political institutions on national and European levels to trigger increases of saving ratios in Europe. Such measures will buttress up a sustainable growth regime leading new EU-members towards the eurozone.

3. Ezoneplus Final Report:

Michael Bolle (ed.) *Eurozone Enlargement – Exploring Uncharted Waters*  

This final report of the research project "Ezoneplus - The Eastward Enlargement of the Eurozone" provides a comprehensive analysis of economic and financial consequences of European Monetary Union (EMU) enlargement as well as policy advice. The study concludes that the Central and East European Countries (CEEC) may take decades to catch up economically with their western neighbours unless adequate assistance from the older member countries is being provided. Thus, the success of enlargement depends both on the speed of the process and on the procedure how to implement the right political and economic mechanisms towards sustainable self-financed growth.

The Introduction is online available. Click [here](#) to download PDF Version (142 KB).

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This report deals with questions of fiscal and monetary policies applied in transforming Central and Eastern European economies, which have joined the EU on 1 May, 2004. The report contains three contributions covering basic issues linked to fiscal policy in the stage of preparation for adoption of euro, inflation targeting and monetary policy as well as exchange rate regimes. It can be considered as expanded study of the mentioned subjects prepared in a comparative way which point to common elements and individual solutions applied by individual countries within their policies and their differentiated results as far as inflation control, stabilization of the exchange rate or fiscal balance are concerned. The analysis presented goes deep into the discussed topics, discusses the newest literature, and, in some cases, even reveals facts that contradict rather commonly approved and circulating opinions. An overview of the road covered and of what still lies ahead for countries planning to join the euroarea is being provided. It shows advantages and disadvantages of policies applied by each new EU member state and draws scenarios for the future.

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5. New Ezoneplus Working Papers

(1) Working Paper No. 21, July 2004
Vladimir Lavrac
Fulfillment of Maastricht Convergence Criteria and the Acceding Countries

This paper first touches upon the definition and purpose of the Maastricht convergence criteria, and next analyses the rules, procedures, methodology and interpretation of meeting the Maastricht convergence criteria. It is shown how acceding countries presently fulfill the Maastricht convergence criteria and how the present EMU countries complied with them at a comparable time distance before their own entry in EMU. Some of the related issues, such as monetary and fiscal policy, coordination among economic policies and relationship between nominal and real convergence are dealt with only as much as they have a bearing on the fulfillment of the Maastricht convergence criteria.

Link to the paper (PDF 200 KB)

(2) Working Paper No. 22, July 2004
The Berlin Group
Economic, Political, Institutional as well as Social Risks and Opportunities of EMU Enlargement

The monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) is the subject matter of this paper. We analyze the prospects for future price stability in an enlarged European Monetary and Economic Union (EMU). At the heart of this study are the potential effects of altering decision-making procedure within the Governing Council of the ECB on price stability in the eurozone. The authors compare the impact of three alternative reform scenarios of the ECB Governing Council with the help of a voting-power analysis. It is presumed that a considerable loss of current EMU-members’ influence power especially in favour of joining Central Eastern European Countries (CEECs) results in a loss of monetary credibility of the ECB: As transparency of the decision-making process within the ECB is lacking, markets may consider the ECB to be too much inclined to the economic performances of the CEECs. This has then a negative impact on the level of price stability in Europe. The voting-power analysis indicates which reform proposal is best with respect to a price-stability benchmark.

Link to the paper (PDF 580 KB)
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Link to the paper (PDF 338 KB)